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Abstract
This article assesses the usefulness of the growth models perspective for understanding 
contemporary British capitalism in the context of its ongoing ‘productivity puzzle’ and stagnating 
economic growth. The analysis of British capitalism supports our argument that growth models 
perspective analyses currently have limited capacity to understand the developmental trajectory 
of growth models, the instabilities and dysfunctionalities of these models, and how growth comes 
to be distributed differently across models. Through analysis of capital investment patterns and 
labour market characteristics, it reveals the importance of the ‘politics of productivity’, embedded 
in state institutions, which shapes the nature and distribution of economic growth. The article 
outlines a new framework for growth models analysis that ‘brings the supply-side back in’ for a 
more holistic approach to the political economy of capitalist growth (and non-growth). It argues 
this is critical for understanding patterns of political economic development in the British model 
of capitalism and beyond.
Keywords
British capitalism, comparative political economy, growth models, investment, labour markets, 
productivity puzzle, varieties of capitalism
Introduction
The British model of capitalism is an important case within comparative capitalism debates. 
The Comparative Political Economy (CPE) literature traditionally understands the British 
model as a ‘liberal’ or ‘market-led’ economy (see Coates, 2000). British Political Economy 
scholarship, particularly since 2008, fleshed out the British model’s reliance upon financial 
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capitalism to support economic growth. For several decades, increasing private debt, espe-
cially consumer credit fed by house price inflation, propped up the faltering model as real 
wages and living standards stagnated (see Crouch, 2009; Hay, 2009; Watson, 2010). More 
recently, CPE scholars developed a new ‘growth models perspective’ (GMP)1 (see Baccaro 
and Pontusson, 2016), focused on key demand drivers of growth. This important work has 
shifted focus away from Varieties of Capitalism’s (VoC) firm-focused, supply-side approach 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001) which dominated earlier comparative capitalism work. GMP 
draws upon and dovetails with elements of British Political Economy scholarship to pro-
duce a coherent image of the British economy’s ‘growth model’. Britain’s ‘consumption-
led’ (as opposed to ‘export-led’) model is fuelled by both real wage growth and high 
household debt (Baccaro and Pontusson, 2016: 176). This article assesses the utility of this 
GMP framework for understanding British capitalism’s evolution, using this to shed light 
on wider CPE debates about ‘growth models’ (GMs).
Empirically, British capitalism presents an interesting dilemma for comparative schol-
arship and GM analysis, given its ongoing so-called ‘productivity puzzle’ (PP). Britain’s 
acute lack of productivity growth since the early 2000s is not readily explained by any 
single factor or thesis. The PP is a broader international phenomenon, yet Britain’s pro-
ductivity shortfall is twice as severe as other G7 economies (Sidhu, 2018). Some esti-
mates suggest that productivity growth is 19.7% below its pre-2008 trend, a slowdown 
unprecedented in 250 years (Crafts and Mills, 2020). Enduringly, low productivity since 
the mid-2000s and sluggish growth since 2008, features apparently baked into the British 
economy, throw up a paradox. Contemporary CPE scholars increasingly focus on, and 
delineate, ‘models’ of growth within 21st-century advanced capitalisms, yet these politi-
cal economies are characterised more by instability, crisis and stagnation than by growth. 
‘GM’ analysis has flourished just as capitalist growth itself has largely deserted advanced 
economies. We utilise the British case, and the PP, to explore the implications of this for 
comparative capitalism debates and GM analysis.
While GMP scholarship has contributed valuably to our understanding, the British 
case reveals the need for a more holistic approach to the political economy of capitalist 
growth (and non-growth). Myopically focusing on national models of growth may dis-
tract from important uneven distributional characteristics and regional disparities within 
capitalisms. Furthermore, GMP’s understandable turn away from VoC’s supply-side 
insights commits the opposite but equally significant fallacy of prioritising demand driv-
ers of growth at the expense of the supply-side. The GMP overlooks ‘the politics of pro-
ductivity’, that is, the set of contingent rules, norms and ideas bound up within the state 
that shape supply-side evolutions of the economy, affecting growth trajectories.
We focus on the influential GMP framework as a key intervention in comparative capi-
talism debates. GMP, we argue, contains key analytical and assumptive weak points that 
pose problems for understanding capitalism comparatively, in Britain and beyond. These 
assumptions circumscribe GMP’s ability to understand the developmental trajectory of 
GMs, the instabilities and dysfunctionalities of these models, and the dynamics of how 
growth is distributed differently across models. GMP scholarship not only overstates the 
coherence of GMs, but it also misses the contingency, haphazardness and path dependen-
cies that shape capitalist development. Taking a longer view reveals how GMs are a dia-
chronic phenomenon, and snapshots offer too fleeting a glimpse of political economies. 
We apply sectoral and geographical analyses to the British case, examining how capital 
investment and labour market dynamics affect the PP. The GMP struggles to understand 
the nature and developmental trajectory of the British political economy, crucially 
Clift and McDaniel 3
misreading labour market outcomes integral to its wage-led growth model conception. 
These dynamics, and Britain’s wider ‘politics of productivity’, are key to understanding 
British capitalism, hence the need to bring the supply-side back centre-stage within CPE.
The article begins by exploring CPE’s macro-turn, before analysing the political econ-
omy of the British growth model. A third section establishes our threefold critique of 
GMP’s limitations, while the fourth section utilises the PP to advance an empirical appli-
cation of our central argument. A final section underlines our findings’ wider importance 
for comparative capitalisms and outlines a more holistic approach to GM analysis. This 
considers both demand and supply-sides, and their interaction, to better understand con-
temporary capitalism in Britain and beyond.
CPE’s macro-turn
International Political Economy has, in recent years, attempted to bring the macro econ-
omy back into focus. In a nod to the French regulation school (see Boyer, 2015), Blyth 
and Matthijs (2017) draw links between shifts in temporally specific global macro 
regimes, their consequences, such as rising inequality, and contemporary political dilem-
mas, including austerity in the Eurozone, Trump and Brexit. In tandem, CPE has under-
gone a significant, collective about-turn. The chief target of this ‘macro-turn’ is VoC (see 
Hall and Soskice, 2001), long dominant within CPE. Influenced by New Keynesian eco-
nomics, and centred on ‘comparative institutional advantage’ rather than growth per se, 
VoC focused on firms and economic actors pursuing comparative advantage through 
supply-side arrangements (see Baccaro and Pontusson, 2018: 7–12). VoC makes sense of 
institutional configurations and inter-relationships, shedding light on how markets oper-
ate, labour market characteristics, corporate governance dynamics, welfare, education 
and training regimes, and distributional outcomes. All these are integral to the ‘politics of 
productivity’ at the heart of our argument. Significantly, VoC does not presume particular 
growth patterns or drivers within British or other capitalisms.
Critiques of VoC questioned its underlying rationalist assumptions and its ontological 
prioritisation of the firm (see, for example, Hay, 2005). Dissatisfied with VoC’s firm-level 
micro-foundations, macro-oriented CPE set out an influential GMP framework, re-concep-
tualising comparative capitalisms analysis (see Baccaro and Howell, 2017; Baccaro and 
Pontusson, 2016; Hall, 2018; Johnston and Regan, 2016; Streeck, 2016). GMP analysis 
provides important fresh avenues for models of capitalism research – shifting away from 
analysing supply-side production regimes towards studying the economy’s demand-side.
The GMP focuses on a diversity of forms of ‘demand regimes’ in developed econo-
mies, each assumed to deliver growth. Drawing on post-Keynesian (specifically neo-
Kaleckian) theory (see Bhaduri and Marglin, 1990; Kohler and Stockhammer, 2021; 
Stockhammer, 2013), this macro-CPE work distinguishes two different models for gener-
ating and sustaining demand: consumption-led and export-led growth. Both emerged 
after the collapse of the post-war Fordist wage-led model, but they have different distri-
butional implications (see Baccaro and Pontusson, 2016). We consider these in relation to 
the British case in more detail in the next section.
The British model in the political economy literature
In earlier CPE accounts, the British economy has traditionally been characterised as ‘mar-
ket-oriented’ or a ‘liberal market economy’ (LME), rather than a ‘coordinated market 
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economy’ (CME) such as Germany (Coates, 2000; Hall and Soskice, 2001). The British 
economy’s LME characteristics include its highly liberalised markets for labour and 
finance, competitive market dynamics defining inter-firm and state-firm relations, and the 
importance of ‘shareholder value’ in corporate governance (see Hall and Soskice, 2001: 
8–9, 27–30). VoC sees these supply-side characteristics as the institutional foundations of 
British comparative advantage. Similar interpretations are also found in institutionally 
attuned British Political Economy accounts of post-war capitalism (see Coates, 2018; 
English and Kenny, 2000; Gamble, 1981). British allegiance to circulating/financial 
rather than manufacturing/industrial capital (see Glyn and Sutcliffe, 1972), alongside a 
lack of private productive investment, has historical roots in British ‘gentlemanly capital-
ism’ (Cain and Hopkins, 2002). The ‘aristocratically dominated’ financial sector eschewed 
‘close, long-term relations with local manufacturing industry’ and instead pursued short-
term profit elsewhere (Coates, 2000: 51). The British state’s historical and institutional 
path dependencies, including a deep-seated antipathy to public intervention and the pub-
lic realm, frustrated post-war modernisation (see Gamble, 1981; Hutton, 1995; Marquand, 
1988), leaving the British economy weakly organised, relying heavily on limited 
Keynesian demand-management techniques (Shonfield, 1969).
The New Right under Margret Thatcher reorganised the British economy in the 1980s 
(see Gamble, 1988; Hall, 1993), eroding trade union rights and power, and reducing wel-
fare generosity. Pursuing strict fiscal conservatism and a partial application of monetarist 
principles (see Clift, 2020), Thatcher orchestrated significant financial market liberalisa-
tion, heralding a new, distinct growth dynamic (see Coates, 2018; Crouch, 2009; Gamble, 
2012, 2019; Hay, 2013; Lavery, 2019). Amid the decomposition of the post-war interna-
tional Keynesian order, there was a structural shift from manufacturing to services. New 
Right restructuring entailed stagnating wages and rising inequality, contributing to demand 
shortfalls (Lavery, 2019: 21–25). The key characteristic of Britain’s ‘Anglo-liberal growth 
model’ (Hay, 2013: 25) from the 1980s up to 2008 was ‘easy access to credit, much of it 
secured against a rising property market’ that drove ‘largely consumer-led and private-
debt-financed’ growth (see Watson, 2010). Britain was unusually heavily dependent upon 
financial services, constituting nearly 10% of economy. The resultant tax receipts were 
vital for sustaining public finances. Private debt, especially mortgage debt, compensated 
for declining wage-led demand and government expenditure. Crouch (2009: 390) memo-
rably labelled this regime ‘privatised Keynesianism’.
There has been no detailed GMP examination of the British case, although key contours 
are sketched out by Baccaro and Pontusson (2016) for the purposes of comparison. The 
main driver of British economic growth is reportedly household consumption, achieved 
through real wage growth and significant increases in household debt (Baccaro and 
Pontusson, 2016: 176). Germany and Britain are seen as ‘mirror images’. Germany created 
a low-wage labour market in private services to facilitate its export-oriented growth strat-
egy, dampening domestic demand and keeping production costs low. Meanwhile, the 
British economy generated ‘labor-market conditions favorable to unskilled (service-sec-
tor) workers’ (Baccaro and Pontusson, 2016: 177). British exports are a much smaller 
proportion of the economy and less sensitive to wage levels, concentrated in high-value 
financial and business services that do not compete on cost (Baccaro and Pontusson, 2016: 
191). This Baccaro and Pontusson (2016: 184) see as confirmed by their counter-intuitive 
finding that ‘the wage share has held up better in the United Kingdom’ compared to coun-
tries with ‘more coordinated systems of wage bargaining’ and ‘less dramatic declines of 
union membership’.
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The GMP captures many key attributes of privatised Keynesianism detailed above. 
However, the GMP lacks an appreciation of the historical and institutional specificities 
that have shaped British capitalism. Importantly, it does not capture the linkages between 
the supply and demand sides, and the dysfunctions contained therein. For example, while 
this model sustained prosperity for a growing middle class in the 1990s and 2000s, it was 
premised upon a fragile ‘low interest rate–low inflation equilibrium’, designed to nurture 
the boom (Hay, 2013: 25–26). Buoyant consumption and a growing labour-intensive ser-
vice sector masked industrial decline and poor human capital development. Low interest 
rates reinforced historical patterns of weak productive investment (Hay, 2013: 27). 
Financialisation of the British economy exacerbated pre-existing sectoral and regional 
imbalances in wealth, investment and economic dynamism (see Berry and Hay, 2016). 
Following the crash, this fragile financialised model was shored up through extraordinary 
‘monetary indiscipline’ (see Green and Lavery, 2018). Reflecting these dysfunctionalities 
and fragilities, an arresting feature of Britain’s growth model has been its ongoing pro-
ductivity crisis.
British capitalism’s PP
Productivity increases are crucial for economic growth, traditionally determining work-
ers’ living standards, yet Britain is experiencing an enduring, perhaps systemic, produc-
tivity downturn. The British economy shifted in the mid-2000s from a 20th-century-long 
historical trend productivity growth path of circa 2.2% per annum, to a much more mea-
gre 0.3%–1%. While this productivity slowdown is an international phenomenon, com-
parisons suggest Britain’s problem is particularly acute (Sidhu, 2018). This productivity 
slump has puzzled economists, with Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) director 
Robert Chote noting, ‘nobody knows quite why it is happening’ (Chote, 2016). The OBR 
and others, tied to standard equilibrium economic assumptions, initially anticipated finan-
cial sector recovery and post-crash, ‘catch-up’ growth, restoring Britain’s prior path 
(OBR, 2017b). Increasingly, however, analysts accepted a ‘new normal’ of lower British 
potential growth (OBR, 2017a). Collapsing productivity explains weak British growth – 
1.1% annually since the 2008 crisis, compared with 3.1% in 1949–1979 and 2.5% in 
1980–2008 (Office for National Statistics (ONS), 2021). Numerous economic theories 
seek to explain this ‘puzzle’ (see Haldane, 2017). Pessoa and van Reenan (2014) contend 
that low wages and flexible labour markets have led to ‘capital shallowing’ during the 
downturn as workers replace structures and equipment, explaining the paradox of declin-
ing unemployment alongside stagnating British productivity (Pessoa and van Reenan, 
2014). Other accounts highlight slowing technological innovation and diffusion, and 
looser monetary conditions, halting the ‘creative destruction’ of firms (see Coates, 2018: 
262; Haldane, 2017: 5–6).
British productivity falling off a cliff highlights a problem with GMP’s focus on 
demand drivers of assumed growth. In neglecting the supply-side, and overlooking the 
‘politics of productivity’, GMP struggles to account for how political economies are often 
characterised more by instability, crisis and stagnation than by growth. While VoC schol-
arship contains its own flaws and limitations, its framework permits analysis of labour 
market characteristics, how markets operate, and distributional and other issues that are 
missing in GMP’s pre-occupation with the demand drivers of growth. The GMP, in 
assuming a priori the presence of national economic growth, fails to conceptualise fully 
the developmental trajectory of GMs, the instabilities and dysfunctionalities of these 
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models, and how growth is distributed differently across models. Exploring the British PP 
in more detail, as we do below, illustrates these points.
The limits of the GM literature
How does the GMP neglect the development and trajectory of GMs? Per post-Keynesian 
theory, the GMP literature shifted analytical focus from the supply-side to the demand-side 
(see Baccaro and Pontusson, 2016; Johnston and Regan, 2018; Stockhammer, 2013). While 
this has generated many valuable insights, the supply-side is problematically absent from 
these accounts. Tellingly, Baccaro and Pontusson’s influential 2016 paper makes no mention 
of productivity – seemingly throwing the productivity baby out with the supply-side bathwa-
ter. Singular focus on the demand-side leads to a ‘lampposts and lost keys’ problem. Hope 
and Soskice (2016: 215–216) note, for instance, how ignoring the supply-side means neglect-
ing German reunification, which significantly reshaped German labour market characteris-
tics. More recent GMP scholarship has begun to address the supply-side, although productivity 
remains marginal (see Baccaro and Benassi, 2017; Baccaro and Pontusson, 2019).
GMP rightly rejects VoC’s ‘efficiency-theoretical and economistic’ underpinnings 
(Streeck, 2016: 244; see Baccaro and Pontusson, 2016: 178), yet it makes its own ques-
tionable assumptions about stability, efficiency and coherence in GMs and their capacity 
to deliver growth and productivity gains. The GMP, like VoC before it, largely overlooks 
the state (for critiques, see Clift, 2012, 2021; Crouch, 2005) and its role in shaping how 
GMs develop (see Hope and Soskice, 2016). In stripping their framework of supply-side 
‘institutional equilibria’, Baccaro and Pontusson (2016: 176) underplay core political 
economy insights into the social and institutional embeddedness of markets, firms and the 
economy (see Clift, 2021; Coates, 2005: 13). In each case, path dependency tells us that 
institutional and policy initiatives aimed at refounding a growth model are overlain on 
dense webs of interrelated institutions that are fundamental to capitalism’s workings 
(North, 1990; Pierson, 2004). Snapshots of demand regimes do not capture the supply-
side dysfunctionalities of British capitalism and its institutional embedding, including its 
low-skill, low-wage flexible labour market; a welfare settlement with diminished auto-
matic stabilisers that subsidise low pay; and low levels of productive investment. Put 
differently, by marginalising the supply-side institutional context, GMP analyses lack 
sufficient appreciation of the ‘politics of productivity’.
Second, how does the GMP literature overlook the inherent instability and dysfunc-
tionality of GMs? Under-appreciation of the politics of institutional creation and repro-
duction feeds a somewhat problematic tendency towards functionalism. The real-world 
evolution of GMs is fortuitous, involving contingency and unintended consequences. 
They were not planned or pre-ordained. GMP scholars overstate the coherence of GMs 
and understate this haphazardness. Despite the passing acknowledgement that ‘all growth 
models are fundamentally precarious’ (Baccaro and Pontusson, 2016: 185), there is insuf-
ficient recognition of potential instability and dysfunctionality (e.g. flatlining productiv-
ity). Caveats notwithstanding, positing a ‘growth model’ assumes a level of stabilising 
functional coherence – that is, in delivering economic growth. Institutions and policies 
are seemingly ‘called forth’ by the GM’s functional requirements, assuming perfect infor-
mation and foresight, and no impediments to establishing the functionally necessary insti-
tutional order. Yet, careful historical analysis indicates that capitalist evolution is not 
determined by pure economic logics or imperatives of efficiency, but by politics, accident 
and unintended consequence (Coates, 2000; Jackson, 2001).
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The iniquitous pathologies of the British economy since the 1980s have sown the 
seeds of 21st-century problems (see Coates, 2018; Hay, 2013; Lavery, 2019). 
Acknowledging this means admitting more instability and potential dysfunctionality into 
understanding GMs and how they change (see, for example, Baccaro and Howell, 2017; 
Boyer, 2015; Howell, 2019; Kohler and Stockhammer, 2021). While Baccaro and 
Pontusson (2016: 196–201) do note that, in particular, credit-financed consumption is 
unstable, as seen in 2007–2008 (Baccaro and Pontusson, 2016: 185–186), their overrid-
ing impression is of Britain’s consumption-led growth facilitating higher real wages as 
compared to export-led GMs, and that wages have been able to grow in line with rising 
productivity. Neither of these is a safe assumption.
Finally, how does GMP literature neglect how growth is distributed? Analysing the 
politics of productivity is vital not just because of its effects on comparative institutional 
advantage (à la VoC), but because it directly shapes patterns of economic growth and 
distribution (see Behringer and van Treeck, 2019; Hein et al., 2020; Hope and Soskice, 
2016: 218–219). Our analysis highlights how demand- and supply-sides interact, with 
adverse distributional outcomes associated with Britain’s highly fragmented service-sec-
tor labour market, marked by a very large financial sector, resulting from successive 
governments’ policy decisions.
Importantly, GMP analyses too often overlook uneven growth distribution. Like VoC 
before it, the GMP presumes a nationally coherent and homogeneous economy. This 
assumes a priori a degree of model coherence and stability. Problematically, this perspective 
irons over institutional particularities and flattens out granular within-nation political eco-
nomic differentiation. Thus, like VoC (Blyth, 2003; Crouch, 2005; Hay, 2019), GMP analy-
ses superimpose abstract ideal typical models on real existing economies as if they were an 
account of their actual properties. Consequently, patterns of uneven development are 
ignored (although see Regan and Brazys, 2020). Below we demonstrate how within-national 
differentiation shapes the distributional implications of GMs. The next section explores the 
British PP, looking first at capital investment and then labour market outcomes.
Britain’s PP and GM analysis
Capital investment and growth: Sectoral analysis
The British PP highlights the need to bring the supply-side and the ‘politics of productiv-
ity’ back in. In the GMP, growth dynamics are read back from the different components 
of aggregate demand (Hope and Soskice, 2016: 210). Yet, exploration of public and pri-
vate investment in Britain, including investment in Research and Development (R&D), 
shows how the capital investment landscape systematically embeds the British model’s 
dysfunctionalities. Returning to the pathologies and ethos of the British state, and the 
consequences of the New Right’s rise (Thain and Wright, 1995: 2–3), academics and 
officials alike have noted how, following the 1976 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
crisis (Ludlam, 1992), British capital spending and public investment nosedived. This 
resulted from a changed British public expenditure framework, enacting planning and 
control via cost–benefit analyses that instilled a bias against capital spending (Balls and 
O’Donnell, 2002; Thain and Wright, 1995: 4–6). It was politically easier to reduce capital 
investment, even if that damaged British productivity and growth potential. GMP’s rela-
tive silence on the state means that it neglects evolutions in British public infrastructure 
investment and their productivity impacts.
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Yet capital investment, both public and private, across the British economy’s different 
sectors matters for economic dynamism. British economic and political power has long 
been highly centralised in London. A strongly London-centric development pattern ‘priv-
ileges interest-bearing financial capital at the expense of capital in the production of 
tradeable commodities’ (Ingham, 1984; MacLeod and Jones, 2018: 121; Thompson, 
2014: 37–43), a sedimented preference with roots in British Empire (see Coates, 2018: 
84, 212; Overbeek, 1990: chs 3 and 4). Under Thatcher, British economic policy became 
even more sympathetic to international capital’s preferences (Godley, 1988; Lavery, 
2019: 698), exacerbating problems for already-struggling British manufacturing (Crafts, 
1991; Tomlinson, 1990). British capital is historically short-termist rather than focused on 
long-term productive investment (see Coates, 2000, 2005; Hutton, 1995; Lavery, 2019: 
21; Marquand, 1988), meaning British industry has not benefitted proportionally from the 
City’s status as Europe’s largest financial centre (Ingham, 1984).
The British state’s built-in antipathy to public investment and lack of strategic support 
for manufacturing industries were telling then and clearly still shape the investment land-
scape. Comparative analysis of Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF), which measures 
expenditure on non-financial assets from both the public and non-government sectors 
expressed as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), reveals this. Over two dec-
ades from 1997, British average GFCF levels were the lowest of any Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nation, with both private and public 
investment lower than the G7 averages (see ONS, 2017: 2; see Table 1). Similarly, R&D 
investment in Britain (1.7% of GDP in 2017) – crucial to high-end production – is well 
below that of Germany (3.0%) and France (2.2%), and lower than EU (2.0%) and OECD 
(2.4%) averages (Rhodes, 2019: 15). This significant under-investment reflects the his-
torical dynamics outlined above, with clear implications for British jobs, productivity and 
economic growth.
A lack of industry and manufacturing investment resulted in rapid and sustained de-
industrialisation from the 1980s (Gamble, 1990: 204–2011), alongside technological 
innovation and service-sector expansion especially in finance, banking and producer ser-
vices. British mines, heavy industry and factories shut due to the deep 1980–1981 
Table 1. Average percentage contribution of government and non-government sectors to 








spend on GFCF as a 
% of GDP
Average non-
government spend on 
GFCF as a % of GDP
Canada 16.3 83.7 3.6 18.5
France 17.8 82.2 3.9 17.8
Germany 10.6 89.4 2.2 18.3
Italy 13.9 86.1 2.9 16.8
Japan 24.1 75.9 6.0 18.6
United Kingdom 14.4 85.6 2.4 14.3
United States 18.7 81.3 3.9 17.0
G7 average 16.6 83.4 3.5 17.3
Reproduction of ONS (2017: 11, Table 2). Data from: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development.
GFCF: Gross Fixed Capital Formation; GDP: gross domestic product.
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recession. Today, production industries including manufacturing comprise just 13% of 
economic output, compared to nearly 80% for services (Booth, 2021). Financial deregu-
lation in the context of intensifying international competition fuelled this shift (Martin, 
1989: 396). Limited state intervention through industrial and regional development poli-
cies, however, meant no substantive regeneration in former industrial heartlands. The 
service industries that emerged to replace some manufacturing failed to develop in hard-
est-hit de-industrialised regions. Those with low or moderate skills levels had to accept 
low wages and precarious working conditions (see, for example, Crouch, 2010: 32–33; 
O’Donovan, 2020: 261).
Repeating historical patterns, government efforts since the 1990s sought to enhance 
the British workforce’s skills. Under New Labour, higher education was greatly expanded. 
There was investment in the science base, but the coherence and scale of these efforts 
remain questionable. Age-old problems of comparatively weak educational outcomes and 
inadequate vocational and technical skills infrastructures, unearthed during the British 
decline debates (see English and Kenny, 2000), endured. The British state’s pathologies 
means its education and training system perennially struggles to equip the workforce with 
the requisite skills and knowledge (Coates, 2000: 47; Crafts, 1993). Comparatively higher 
productivity growth in manufacturing than services meant service expansion and manu-
facturing erosion directly impacted growth (see Haldane, 2017: 10). The British PP is at 
least partly explained by the economy’s reliance upon low-productivity, low-skilled ser-
vice-sector employment (Berry, 2014; Berry and Hay, 2016; Lavery, 2019) and govern-
ment’s unwillingness to pursue more interventionist or directive ‘upskilling’ to assist 
transition towards high-end exports.
Britain’s laissez-faire approach to industrial restructuring exacerbated the shift towards 
a largely domestically oriented service-sector economy, resulting in a cavernous gap 
between a minority of highly productive firms and a majority of productivity ‘laggards’. 
British exports are mainly high-end financial and business services. By international 
standards, the British economy has a long, thin upper tail of highly productive ‘frontier’ 
firms (the 99th percentile of firms) that tend to be export-oriented. These are around a 
third more productive than domestically oriented firms (Haldane, 2017: 14). New Labour 
attempted a partial shift from the laissez-faire Thatcherite approach, championing ‘post-
neoclassical endogenous growth theory’ as part of its attempt to use public power to forge 
a ‘knowledge-intensive’ economy (Balls and O’Donnell, 2002; O’Donovan, 2020). 
However, interventions were more market-conforming than market-shaping, with new 
public management dictates prevailing within the public sector. The fiscal philosophy of 
the age meant investment expanded through private finance initiative projects that lacked 
the developmental state ethos whose absence Marquand (1988) mourned. Despite 
increased investment in education, ongoing labour market liberalisation designed to facil-
itate the knowledge economy only exacerbated the divergence between high- and low-
productivity firms. Some firms have excelled under increased global competition, 
deploying better technology and more educated sections of the workforce, but many low-
skill, low-pay jobs remain (see O’Donovan, 2020: 261; see also Crouch, 2010; Iversen 
and Soskice, 2019: 138–142).
Britain’s politics of productivity has resulted not in a homogeneous national growth 
model, but in uneven, iniquitous development, regional disparities and a disjuncture 
between the ‘frontier firms’ and productivity laggards (see Berry and Hay, 2016; Haldane, 
2017). The sectoral shift towards services (and particularly finance) had clear geographic 
implications, with severe adverse consequences for Northern England, Scotland and 
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Wales, and a massive concentration of economic prosperity and dynamism in and around 
London. Investment data reflect this geographical imbalance, with GFCF spend heavily 
focused on the South. Averaged across 2000–2016, 38% of total investment was allocated 
to the South of England (London, the SE and SW) alone, while Northern Ireland and 
Wales received just 3% and 4%, respectively. Moreover, there is a huge regional disparity 
in R&D funding, with highs of £963 per capita spend in the East of England, £741 in the 
South East and £629 in London, and lows of £267 and £238 in the North East and Wales, 
respectively (Rhodes, 2019: 11).
This has significant knock-on productivity effects. London (the most productive 
region) and the South East of England are the only two regions of the British where pro-
ductivity is above the British average; productivity in London is 63% higher than in 
Wales (the least productive region) (ONS, 2018b). The much higher concentration of 
‘frontier firms’ in London and the South East undoubtedly contributes to this (Haldane, 
2017: 14). Investment patterns reinforce these trends, with Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) biased towards the South East and overall incidence of FDI projects increasing 
fivefold in Southern England between the mid-1980s and mid-2000s, compared to just 
1.4 times in the North (Wren and Jones, 2009: 16, Table 6). This links to geographically 
disparate attempts to build a knowledge economy, with the geographical distribution of 
high-skilled knowledge work being ‘extremely uneven’, exacerbating pre-existing pat-
terns of interregional inequality (O’Donovan, 2020: 261). Britain’s economic recovery 
from the 2008 crisis reflected the consequences of this divergence. By 2016, only in 
London and the South East had GDP-per-head growth exceeded the pre-crisis peak 
(Haldane, 2016: 23, Chart 11).
The Coalition Government from 2010 vaunted a ‘rebalancing’ of British capitalism to 
limit its unusually heavy dependence upon financial services. Reinvigoration of the 
Midlands and the North promised to forge a ‘Northern powerhouse’ through transport and 
other infrastructure investments redressing regional inequalities, but delivery was mea-
gre. The North East and parts of the Midlands remained profoundly scarred by de-indus-
trialisation. A lack of regeneration investment or public provision meant parts of the 
British economy never recovered from the 1980–1981 recession. Instead of rebalancing, 
post-2008 a laissez-faire approach prevailed, which equated to ‘the revival of the finan-
cial growth model’ (Gamble, 2012: 72). Financial sector reforms such as Project Merlin 
‘were in fact steered away from attempts at reforming the evident failures in British neo-
liberal model of finance-led capitalism’ (Grimshaw, 2013: 576). Anaemic growth saw 
politicians push for a quicker fix – pursuing policies more congruent with the economy’s 
existing crisis-prone institutional path dependencies. The Bank of England and govern-
ment introduced policies to restart house price appreciation as the economy’s underpin-
ning source of value (Green and Lavery, 2018; Hay, 2013). Failed ‘rebalancing’ leaves 
British growth and productivity characterised by disjuncture; a rupture between its highly 
productive, export-oriented financial service and business service firms, clustered in the 
economically prosperous South, and a lower skilled, domestically oriented, service-sector 
economy in the rest of Britain that lags behind.
Labour market outcomes and the distribution of growth
Overlooking the politics of productivity means neglecting critical dynamics of how 
British economic growth is generated, including sectoral and geographical dysfunction-
alities and disparities. Britain’s PP highlights further GMP limitations in appreciating 
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how demand is generated and distributed within economies. Baccaro and Pontusson 
(2016: 184) note counter-intuitively that ‘the wage share has held up better in the United 
Kingdom’ compared to countries with more coordinated systems of wage bargaining and 
stronger unions. Alongside growing household debt, GMP identifies this as important for 
British consumption-led growth. Yet this resilient labour share characterisation is prob-
lematic, blind to the institutional specificities of the British labour market. In particular, 
it under-appreciates the financial sector’s distorting role. Correcting this misrepresenta-
tion highlights how the production regime shapes the demand regime.
Income inequality data reveal how Britain is more unequal than its major European 
competitors are. The ratio between disposable income for the top and bottom 20% of 
earners is higher in Britain (5.63) than in Germany (5.07) or France (4.23) (see Chart 1 
below). Measured in terms of the Gini Coefficient, British income inequality stood at a 
coefficient of 0.351 in 2012, compared to 0.305 in France and 0.289 in Germany, accord-
ing to OECD data.2
The distinct division between a minority of very high-productivity firms and the 
majority of other firms produces inequities within the labour market (see Coates, 2018: 
98; Iversen and Soskice, 2019). The British labour market has enabled a relatively small 
number of (mostly) university graduates to access well-paid work in high-wage service-
sector work (financial and professional services), in firms that are disproportionately 
clustered in London and South East England (Haldane, 2017: 32, Chart 22A+B). 
Financial sector wages are high across the continent, but disproportionately so in Britain. 
Whereas the average European financial sector ‘wage premium’ is 28%, and c. 35% in 
Germany and c. 22% in France, the British wage premium is over 45% (Denk, 2015: 
16–17). OECD research highlights that financial sector employment raises the British 
Gini coefficient particularly acutely (adding 0.026), compared with France (0.007) and 
Germany (0.002) (Denk, 2015: 23). Meanwhile, precarity, low skill levels, low-produc-
tivity service-sector work and low wages characterise much of the wider British labour 
market. At 21.3%, Britain has a larger pool of low-wage earners (those earning two-thirds 
or less of the national median gross hourly wage) than the EU average (17.2%) (Eurostat, 
2016). It has the eighth highest concentration of low-wage earners in Europe, just behind 
Chart 1. Income inequality in Europe.
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Germany (22.5%) and far ahead of France (8.8%) (Eurostat, 2016). There is, moreover, 
significant geographical inequality within this. Given the sectoral shifts described above, 
only London, the South East and the East of England are above the British average for 
gross disposable household income (GDHI) at the regional level3 (ONS, 2018a: Table 2). 
GDHI in the North East, Northern Ireland and Wales is less than 60% of the level in 
London (ONS, 2018a: see Table 2).
Britain’s politics of productivity has produced deeply uneven patterns of sectoral and 
geographic growth that directly influence labour market outcomes. This is all missing 
from GMP’s characterisation, however. The British labour market is far from the ‘mirror 
image’ of Germany’s low-wage model. The GMP’s conception of British demand regime 
is limited by its failure to fully account for the financial sector’s distorting effects at the 
heart of British production regime. For instance, calculation of the ‘labour share’ includes 
bonus payments, which are disproportionately high in Britain because of its oversized 
financial sector. As Stockhammer (2015: 6) has noted, the inclusion of ‘sharply rising 
management remuneration’ as part of the labour share in national accounts distorts the 
picture, suggesting misleadingly that it has not fallen in the Britain and United States as 
dramatically as in Europe and Japan. In the pre-crisis period, British annual bonuses 
peaked at 7.1% of total pay in 2008 (ONS, 2016: 4). These bonuses were heavily concen-
trated in the financial and insurance sectors, and there is significant intra-country varia-
tion in this concentration. For example, OECD data show that bonus-related pay makes 
up around 22.5% of British finance sector remuneration, but less than 5% in the rest of the 
economy. By contrast, in France and Germany, bonuses are less inequitably distributed; 
bonuses are less significant in finance (at around 15%–16% of sector pay) and more sig-
nificant in the wider economy (at around 8%–9% of pay) (see Denk, 2015: Figures 5, 13).
This has a direct effect on the labour share statistic. As Bell and Van Reenan (2010: 3) 
note, British income inequality has increased significantly, ‘driven by increasingly large 
bonus payments made to the better off’. Workers in the top decile of earners have bene-
fited, their share of the total wage bill rising by 5.9 percentage points between 1979 and 
2008, from 19.8% to 25.7%. Meanwhile, all other workers have lost out, with losses 
‘rather evenly spread across the lower nine deciles of the wage distribution’ (Bell and Van 
Reenan, 2010: 3, 5). Importantly, ‘almost the entire increase in wage inequality over the 
last decade is a result of increased bonuses going to workers at the top of the wage distri-
bution’ (Bell and Van Reenan, 2010: 10). Thus, the notion of British labour share ‘holding 
up’, critical for mooted strong wage-led demand regime underpinning the British growth, 
is erroneous. Extreme income inequalities resulting from British supply-side orientation, 
especially the predominance of financial capitalism, maintain an artificially high ‘labour 
income share’ that distorts the image of Britain’s growth model.
Turning from distribution to the productivity implications of British labour market 
characteristics, the institutional complementarities that comparative capitalisms scholar-
ship identifies explain how flexible labour markets interact with particular education poli-
cies and skills regimes. Parts of the matrix of economic institutions within a political 
economy fit together, and efficiency gains (or losses) accrue from these felicitous (or 
unfortunate) interconnections and symbiotic, synergistic inter-relationships (see North, 
1990; Pierson, 2004). Within ‘stakeholder’ capitalism, commitments to develop and 
enhance human capital within the firm dovetail with institutions and regulations that 
place limits on hiring and firing. Stakeholder labour market institutions make ‘poaching’ 
of skilled workers difficult, incentivising in-firm training and ‘upskilling’ the workforce. 
Internal corporate governance structures tend to induce loyalty and empower the workers 
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through representation on the board – prioritising ‘voice’ over ‘exit’ (Hirschman, 1970). 
Enhancing of human capital in this way benefits the firm, the employees, and the econ-
omy as a whole. The societal impact is increasing productivity, facilitating moves towards 
higher value-added commodity production. An education infrastructure that is supportive 
of industrial requirements and ‘patient capital’ financing relations with regional or local 
banks that enable firms to prioritise long-term firm strategy are also features of this model 
(Hutton, 1995).
All of these institutional characteristics contrast with the British labour market’s low-
wage, low-skill proclivities. The British economy has long been more driven by a short-
termist shareholder value logic, favouring ever-freer capital and labour markets. More 
restrictions on hiring and firing are anathema to British policy-makers. They are not 
deemed a price worth paying for increased scope to build skills and enhance human capi-
tal. This arguably restricts the path to higher productivity growth. These drivers help 
explain the British economy’s specialisation in the low value-added service sector at the 
expense of higher skills and higher value-added production. A lack of training and 
‘upskilling’ is a key characteristic of British capitalism, with government ‘active’ labour 
market policies strongly geared towards making workers available for any (low-quality) 
job, rather than investing in human capital. Education and training reforms by successive 
British governments have not materially improved ‘human capital formation’ (Berry, 
2014). Compared to the Nordic states, for example, the British invest much less heavily 
in service provision and in human capital formation, skills, training and education, includ-
ing higher education and activation policies (Iversen and Stephens, 2008; Stephens, 2010: 
Tables 35.1, 35.2), explaining superior Nordic economic performance.
These labour market, education and skills infrastructure characteristics are primary 
institutional and systemic factors underpinning Britain’s PP. Britain’s flexible low-wage 
labour market led businesses to invest in labour rather than on capital following the GFC. 
This process of ‘capital shallowing’ adversely affects productivity by both increasing 
labour hours and reducing the stock of capital (Pessoa and van Reenan, 2014). As Sarah 
O’Connor (2015) in the Financial Times notes, ‘Whether you choose to call it a “jobs 
miracle,” a “productivity disaster” or a “cost of living crisis,” you are describing the same 
phenomenon: very strong employment gains relative to economic output, with the corol-
lary of dreadful productivity and wage growth’. This supply-side dysfunctionality con-
strains productivity growth and alter the labour market’s distributional dynamics, and yet 
goes unaccounted for in the GMP framework.
Bringing the supply-side back in: A path to future GM 
analysis
The GMP has much to commend it for; the framework advanced by Baccaro and Pontusson 
(2016) has valuably brought demand-side issues back into mainstream CPE debates around 
models of growth and comparative capitalisms. In doing so, it has advanced our under-
standing of the forces driving how economies responded to the crisis of wage-led Fordism 
in the 1970s. It has corrected some of the pitfalls and oversights apparent within the VoC 
literature by better appreciating the drivers of economic demand, how states help repro-
duce these patterns of demand and how economies fit into the global economy. Nevertheless, 
this article has highlighted some problematic theoretical premises of the GMP. Primarily, 
these result from its oversight of the supply-side of the economy and thus the politics of 
productivity. The consequence of this, we suggest, is an impaired capacity to understand 
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the developmental trajectory of GMs, the instabilities and dysfunctionalities of these mod-
els, and how growth comes to be distributed differently across models.
There have already been steps taken within the GM literature that help to adjust for some 
of these limitations. The work of Baccaro and Howell (2017) and Howell (2019), for instance, 
though operating very much within the GMP framework, permits a much greater apprecia-
tion of the instability and dysfunctionality of GMs. This includes pointing out how contem-
porary GMs are unstable in part due to their lack of ‘a well-functioning institutional 
mechanism ensuring that aggregate demand grows in tandem with aggregate supply’ 
(Howell, 2019: 464). Outside of the GMP, Hassel and Palier’s (2021) edited collection pro-
vides an important holistic framework for analysing GMs. They contend that ‘we need to 
combine (and not substitute) an understanding of how the supply-side of the economy adjusts 
to existing and changing institutions with an analysis of how aggregate demand is driving 
economic growth’ (Hassel and Palier, 2021: 13). The authors propose an ‘augmented synthe-
sis’ of demand-focused and supply-side-focused accounts in order to ‘provide a more detailed 
and differentiated account of existing regimes’ (Hassel and Palier, 2021: 17) in much the 
same way we have argued for here. Indeed, this article has demonstrated the importance and 
relevance of a more holistic approach for understanding the British model of capitalism and 
its productivity crisis. To recap, three lines of analysis have emerged.
First, exploring Britain’s PP has underscored the necessity of bringing the supply-side 
back into GM analyses to understand how historical path dependencies and institutionally 
mediated regulatory reform processes shape patterns of productivity, economic growth 
and distribution. Extreme income inequalities resulting from the supply-side orientation 
of British capitalism, especially the predominance of financial capitalism, distort ‘labour 
income share’ statistics. This conceals the British labour market’s highly iniquitous out-
comes – indicating wages do less to fuel high household demand than GMP’s image of 
Britain’s growth model recognises. Comparative GM analyses thus need to relax assump-
tions of internal model coherence and appreciate how certain rules, norms and ideas, 
historically bound up within state institutions, direct supply-side economic policy in par-
ticular directions. This will likely increase model complexity, but it avoids neglecting or 
assuming away all the rich granularity of evolving capitalist institutions that is the empiri-
cal lifeblood of CPE analysis.
Second, CPE scholarship should be wary of relying upon economic efficiency and 
stability assumptions. The GMP literature often assumes that if GMs demonstrate coher-
ence, growth and productivity gains will follow. This reflects a broader penchant within 
rationalist political economy for stabilising equilibrium assumptions about the ‘normal’ 
operations of a growth model (for a critique, see Baccaro and Howell, 2017). These can 
neglect the negative pathologies of instability and fragility to which capitalist GMs are 
prone (see, for example, Boyer, 2015; Kohler and Stockhammer, 2021). Britain’s PP 
reflects not temporally specific failings, but structurally embedded dysfunctionalities in 
Britain’s model of capitalism. We should heed Hay’s (2016: 527) counsel by focusing on 
‘the pathological/disequilibrating interaction between capitalist institutional configura-
tions and particular growth strategies’, as well as ‘the institutionalised rationalities in and 
through which such cumulatively destabilising practices became habitualised’.
Finally, comparative GM analysis must develop a more nuanced conception of 
‘national’ GMs. The GMP literature assumes a within-nation ‘convergence’ dynamic 
whereby the supposedly efficient and coherent logic of British growth model induces the 
rest of national economy to emulate London. Unsurprisingly, it has failed to do so. 
Capitalism, after all, is shaped by public policy (e.g. regional (under)investment, skills 
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and education policies) and is embedded in distinct social contexts, sustained by specific 
institutional infrastructures. The logical corollary of this is not a monoculture, but a var-
iegated picture both between and within nations (Clift and McDaniel, 2021). Tendencies 
towards instability and dysfunction causing uneven geographic development crucially 
explain aspects of Britain’s PP, yet are simply not visible in much GMP literature. GMP’s 
overriding demand-side focus neglects linkages between the supply- and demand-sides, 
and fails to grasp how the production regime can shape the demand regime.
Our analysis thus complements recent comparative capitalism work by charting a new 
path for GM analysis, offering a more contingent, open-ended account of capitalist 
change, with a central focus on the relationship between the supply and demand compo-
nents of the economy (Hassel and Palier, 2021). This means deconstructing capitalist 
forms into constituent elements (Crouch, 2005: 440), potentially throwing up fewer gen-
eralisable trends and complicating ideal typical categorisations. However, this new holis-
tic strategy is instrumental to effectively analysing patterns of economic development.
This will be essential for understanding and analysing attempts by policy-makers to 
shape new models of growth over the next decade. In the British case, the Conservative 
government has promised renewed post-Brexit economic dynamism and pledged to 
‘level up’ the economy. However, the ability of initiatives such as ‘freeports’ and a 
British ‘ARPA’-style blue skies research agency to renew the economy’s productive tis-
sue remains in question, given the historical and institutional legacies documented here, 
and the dismal record over many decades of previous governments promising to boost 
Britain’s long-term growth potential. Indeed, while Brexit represents a significant politi-
cal economic change, without considerable political determination its enactment is lia-
ble to entrench British capitalism’s pre-existing dysfunctions and instabilities. 
Simultaneously, manufacturing and other productive sectors of the British economy 
have been hit hard by the COVID-19 pandemic, magnifying existing distributional 
asymmetries. Beyond the British case, the European Union is responding to pandemic-
related supply-chain shocks through attempts to strategically reorient its productive sec-
tors, promoting ‘self-sufficiency’ and ‘economic resilience’. Understanding the politics 
of productivity is thus more important than ever for making sense of the evolution of 
contemporary British and European capitalisms.
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Notes
1. Growth models perspective (GMP) is used to denote the framework developed by Baccaro and Pontusson 
(2016) and those works that adopt it. This can be distinguished from the wider ‘growth model analysis’ 
referred to in this article, which describes a broader literature that focuses on analysing growth models 
from a variety of perspectives, using different frameworks.
2. https://data.oecd.org/inequality/income-inequality.htm
3. Defined as the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) Level 1.
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